



**After Action Report – Winter Storm Uri 2021**

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**What Went Well**

**Emergency Operations Center Overall:**

- There were no employee injuries. First responders were committed to the safety of personnel and community recovery.
- Effective in sharing resources with regional partners, relying on previously built relationships, and addressing city facility challenges. We were able to build on these relationships, assess needs, and share resources.
- In the EOC, roles and tasks were not siloed based on position. There was a collaborative team environment in which EOC members, despite roles or positions, executed emergency response, shared responsibilities, and helped one another.
- Utilities, facilities, streets, and PARD were able to assist PD with transportation needs. This allowed personnel to be transported to EOC, allowed patrol to respond to emergencies, transport diesel to necessary stations, and provide Wastewater Plant support when needed.
- Recent technology upgrades allowed for effective communication, organization of tasks, and remote employee integration. Ongoing internal communications allowed for smoother operations, organization of personnel, and distribution/collection of resources.
- Involving police communications in multi-daily briefings allowed for efficient response to public needs and concerns.
- Due to existing relationships and established contacts, the City was able to frequently communicate and discuss status updates with Oncor, Manville and SW Water personnel during the storm event.
- Use of WebEOC to request resources and communicate with Travis County.
- State and County resource requests were submitted as soon as needs were identified.

**Communications Specific:**

- Communications focused on timely, important, and clear responses. This resulted in a focus on issues that the City could control.
- Expedited approval process for communications allowed for information to be sent quickly.
- Creating the winter storm URL ([www.pflugervilletx.gov/winterstorm](http://www.pflugervilletx.gov/winterstorm)) allowed for a centralized, accessible center for winter storm related news, including information regarding boil water notices.
- Staff used formatting on the website and social media that was light on images and formatting so that users would not have to use a lot of data when accessing information.
- Social media engagement (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Nextdoor) was incredibly successful in sending out information.
  - From February 12-24 on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, the city's 340 posts were seen over 1.2 million times. This is a 1,568% increase over impressions in the time period preceding. On the city's Nextdoor, there were 46 posts that were viewed 50,928 times.
  - Engagement also saw a steep increase. Facebook, Twitter and Instagram posts were engaged with (likes, comments and shares) 132,685 times. During that time period, the city sent 851 posts, comments and direct messages. The City received 5,705 comments and direct messages. On Nextdoor, there were 458 total replies (comments) on 46 posts.
  - Social media saw a 5,289% net audience growth increase. Gaining 729 follows on Twitter, 1,214 Facebook page likes, and 187 Instagram follows.
  - City staff saw a sharp increase in engagement on Twitter because residents used that platform in an emergency.
  - The level of engagement on social media remained high, even when a majority of the City was without electricity.
  - View the City Social Media Report for more.
- Nixle engagement saw a 65% increase in base subscribers (SMS and Email) with a total of 35 Winter Weather emergency messages sent regarding weather conditions, road closures and information on police activity. Subscriber counts increased from 9,602 on February 12 to 15,834 on February 24.
- The City of Pflugerville website saw an increase in traffic. The Winter Storm update page had a total of 24.1k views, with the homepage receiving 31.3k views. Overall, the Pflugerville website saw 205,449 total views, an increase of 352%.
  - Utility Billing webpage saw an increase in traffic, 41.1k views total. This is a 296% increase compared to the previous period (Jan 30 – Feb 11).

- View the Winterstorm Website Stats (with Graphs) report for more information.
- PfHelps was created by IT to address resident concerns during the Winterstorm and the week following. A total of 239 messages were received.

**Misc:**

- Utilities: During times without power, utilities created and coordinated plans to address critical, priority needs. This allowed a smooth order of operations once electrical service resumed.
- Police Communications: Dispatch helped mitigate EOC calls, transferring calls to the proper channels, such as utility calls. The community appreciated someone personally answering calls. Utility Billing did an excellent job in handling calls.
- GIS Maps: GIS maps were incredibly important and useful for addressing Boil Water Notice messages. Maps helped citizens clearly see if their notice had been lifted and which entity supplies their area with water.

## What Needs to Improve – Ways to Be Prepared

**Emergency Operations Center Overall:**

- Setting up EOC ahead of event is essential, especially during a three-day weekend. Having to set up the EOC and getting personnel to the EOC delayed an in-person response.
  - One of the biggest issues was mobility and getting personnel to EOC and in the field. Improvements and planning should address this.
- There is a need for an increase of personnel at the EOC and in the field overall.
- Need to establish an EOC food plan and schedule and making clear assignments to ensure EOC and field personnel receive the provisions they need in a timely manner. Lack of a clear plan and assignments led to late meals and inefficient use of time.
- Establishing a plan for restrooms in the case of emergency (down power/water) is needed.

**Misc:**

- Establishing emergency shelters for employees.
- Continued implementation of risk and resilience plan that was completed in 2020 for water system.
- Continue to take existing lift stations offline, as possible, with gravity interceptors to prevent issues at lift stations during emergency events.

- Establishing a keys system for internal operations and having a redundancy of keyholders.
- Water distribution issue: The water distribution issue was the result of a communications error between the State and the water provider. The public was upset at first with lack of communication, but once the details were determined, volunteers and the public were provided timely information. The Mayor did take the brunt of this backlash, but lessons have been learned for the future.
- Finance: Creation of an action policy for exempt and non-exempt employees during emergencies.

**Items that should be collected/created/purchased:**

- Master keys for vehicles and buildings
- Building automation systems for facilities.
- Develop and keep current water and wastewater service provider maps, beyond CCN maps, that clarify the provider for each lot and parcel. This would allow GIS maps to be pushed out faster during an emergency event.
- Snow and de-icing attachment/equipment
  - Tailgate sanders, bumper plows
- Posters for EOC
  - Ex: Talking rules, such as quiet voice and non-eoc conversations in hallways
- Storage for drinking water for employees
- Fuel/Diesel Storage – Rolling & Fixed
  - Burn rate/supply life. Including unleaded and diesel as well.
- List of major store contact numbers
- Local organizations who can assist and their capabilities (ex: Chamber, churches, PCDC, etc...)
- Critical facility list Oncor
- PPD specific:
  - Non-perishable food/water stored for emergency
  - Basic cable for the TVs in the EOC
  - Natural gas generator for PD
  - Vehicles:
    - Evaluating winterization options for the fleet, including other makes and models of pursuit rated police vehicle packages.

**Communication Specific:**

- Due to accessibility challenges and new technology, internal communications remained a challenge. An updated EOC internal communications plan is

important for coordinating consistent information messaging to the public and may expedite response times to resident inquiries.

- This includes bringing in Utility Billing and Police Communications.
  - Police Communications should be provided with information on hotels and resources, time entry protocol, response to calls, officer placements, resources for citizens, etc.
- Establishing an EOC call center structure could help for consistent messaging.
- Enhance internal communications to employees during a crisis.
- Communications to the public could be improved by sharing the daily Council reports and creating How-To videos (prepare your home for a freeze/emergency preparedness).
- Sending out emergency communications should be improved. While social media was a valuable resource during this event, not all residents have social media access. Staff is evaluating other potential emergency communications platforms (Reverse 911, Central Texas Warning System, Robocall).
- Explore alternatives to Nixle to allow for targeted group text messaging (employees only, geofence, etc.).
- An organized response plan for PfHelps should be established to reduce the difficulties involved with following emails, coordinate response, and information by topic. Enhanced internal communications will assist with consistent messaging.
- A Boil Water Notice Standard Operating Procedure should be created. (UB Emails, phone calls, Nixle, social media, press release, water districts and TCEQ.)
- Utility district emergency communications SOP should be established.
- Including other service providers in briefings is important.
  - Such as SouthWest Water, Manville, and Oncor. They do not need to be in the EOC.
- A plan for preparing residents for emergency preparation through messaging should be established.
- Alternative communication established if networks and cell are down. (Radios/Satellite phone).

**Utilities Specific:**

- Generators at water treatment plant for a secondary power supply. This is currently in process and staff is coordinating with design team for options on how to expedite the project.
- Improving SCADA alarm system is necessary. If SCADA system goes down, plant alarms will not call out. Staff was able to catch this during the winter storm and

stay on top of the system, however this must be addressed for future emergencies.

**IT Specific:**

- Phone System at City Hall failed when power was lost briefly. Due to the equipment being outdated, a disc drive had to be found to install the host software. We will update this to our VMware 6.7 environment.
- Flooding at City Hall threatened the main server/networking closet for the City side. Due to equipment being raised off the ground, we were able to avoid any major events. However if lost, the City would have lost multiple systems. PD would have remained functional except for wireless connectivity. City side would have lost all connectivity and would have needed to work remotely until equipment was replaced. A network redesign would assist in added network resiliency.

**PPD specific:**

- Actions steps:
  - Patrol Supervisors need to have access to all essential parts of city buildings when keycard stops working
  - Clear, established guidelines for dispatch/patrol regarding response to calls
  - All EOC section chiefs should be present in EOC (whenever possible)
  - Invite Fire/EMS liaison to be present in EOC
  - Establish prior agreed upon access to fuel
- *Communication specific:*
  - Information regarding resources (ie: hotels) provided to sergeants/officers sooner

**Preparing City Facilities/Equipment**

- Establishing an overall facilities SOP
- Gathering fuel supplies (diesel, leaded, unleaded)
- Testing generators prior to event.
- Start and refuel all vehicles prior to freeze is needed.
- Filling water tanks prior to freeze is also essential.
- Facility protection and winterizing overall (plants, streets, etc.) could improve.
- Staff is looking into potentially establishing warming centers.

**Future Training**

- Future training should include all levels of staff, digging deeper and not just utilizing management. All of staff should be prepared and trained to strengthen operations.
  - We are emphasizing, your position does not matter. We all have a hand in emergencies. We established bad weather, but did not call on staff to come in.
- Additional National Incident Management System (NIMS) training
- Hazard Mitigation Plan
- Continuity of Operations Plan

**Questions that have been brought up:**

- Why wasn't the EOC set up sooner?
  - *Conversations with Travis County were occurring before Sunday. A core group of EOC personnel were communicating before going together in person. We didn't expect long-term power outages because we were told to expect rolling outages in 45 min to 1 hour durations. We didn't plan for what happened, but got caught in it.*
  - *Austin/Travis County prepared their EOC on Friday, and then fully staffed it Sunday afternoon. We could have establish a skeletal EOC as a precaution in order to have people there that have power, and can communicate, but again, we were never expecting wide-spread long-term power outages.*
- Why don't we have a joint EOC with fire?
  - *We have previously invited ESD2 to have a seat with us, but the response was they have a DOC established and we are welcome to have someone at their DOC. Additionally, we did not have room for the ESD2 DOC staff in our EOC. In the past, (Hurricane Harvey), we have not joined ESD2's DOC since all of our City supplies and phone systems are established in the City's EOC. Further discussions will occur to see if we can establish a liaison and coordinate efforts more efficiently. We were in constant communication with the ESD the entire time.*
- Why didn't we have backup generators? Where are we in the process?
  - *The Pflugerville Surface Water Treatment Plant was originally designed and constructed without an emergency generator on-site as it wasn't deemed necessary as part of the design at the time. As the population of Pflugerville grew and required a larger volume of water to meet demands, an emergency generator is something that is both important to have and a necessity to keep up with water demands in the event of an emergency.*

*A project to provide emergency generation at the water plant was initiated in April 2020 when the City released a Request for Qualifications for engineering design services associated with an emergency power generation system for both the surface water treatment plant and the Lake Pflugerville pump station. The City received six statement of qualifications in May 2020 from design firms that were reviewed, ranked, and scored and the most qualified firm was identified in July 2020. The City negotiated a scope and fee for the project and a Professional Services Agreement was approved by the Pflugerville City Council in late September 2020 for the design of the emergency generation system. Since that time, the design firm and City staff have been working to identify the details and size of an emergency generation system for both the current treatment plant and the final buildout design of the treatment facility. The design consultant completed their Preliminary Engineering Report in December in collaboration with City staff and identified the various options that the City has to move the emergency generation project forward.*

- *The City is currently moving forward with the production of plans for the project and anticipates construction to start in 2021. Staff is currently coordinating with design consultant to see how this project can be expedited.*
- **Did we reach out to Oncor? Could we have reached out sooner?**
  - *Yes, the City reached out to Oncor when power was lost. However, Oncor responded that they could not do anything for us. They could not prioritize our water system as the entire grid was in jeopardy at the time. Oncor reported that they were only prioritizing hospitals and nursing homes. This is a policy/state issue that should be pursued.*
- **Where were our water supply tanks?**
  - *The water supply tanks were still at 75%-80% full. Stand pipers only have a certain useable amount at the top. For future emergency preparation, we should have filled all of our storage fully.*
- **What technology that was lacking that could have made things better?**
  - *Radios would have been helpful for those in the field and at EOC. When the power went down and some cell services were inoperable, having another route for communication was needed.*



## City Council Comments

### Council Member Weiss

- *Emergency Management Training:*
  - We need lots of training and certification on EOC management
  - We need consulting and part-time or full-time help to keep staff trained
  - Include training for technology; collaboration tools to ensure we can effectively communicate
  - We need to run annual or semi-annual simulations to keep staff prepared
  - Council needs training, too
- *EOC Operation:*
  - We should consider an overlapping schedule; something like four 8-hour shifts with two hours of overlap on each end. We should not have a shift change of all personnel at once.
  - The mayor should provide a daily public briefing
  - Internal staff should hold regular standups to coordinate, likely on a 2- or 3-hours schedule
  - All EOC members should have cell phones on the priority band
  - The “spontaneous volunteer” coordinator should be in the room where it happens and coordinating with volunteer groups daily
  - Define the culture and nature of communications; how free we are with interim updates and what information needs to be held for release
- *Funding:*
  - Evaluate need and additional cost for 4WD and AWD fleet
  - Evaluate need and cost for redundant power across all of our facilities; possibly dual fuel
  - Evaluate infrastructure improvements to deal with winter weather (no pipes on outside walls or where breaks could impact critical equipment)
  - Purchase bumper plows and sand spreaders (can we use fertilizer spreaders that can also be used for parks?)
  - Monitor new legislation (stimulus in particular) for infrastructure grant opportunities and be prepared with projects. Perhaps resilient power could be covered by federal grants.

### Council Member Heath

- Description of your (City Manager) role and actions leading up to, during and after the event
  - Anticipated issues, responses, communication needs

- Event preparation meetings, when did they happen, who was there, what were the action items, who was assigned responsibility(s), etc.
- External coordination efforts....
- Alternative communication protocols ...
- Break down of departments roles and responsibilities
  - Anticipated issues, responses, communication needs
  - Event preparation meetings, when did they happen, who was there, what were the action items, who was assigned responsibility(s), etc.
  - External coordination efforts....
  - Alternative communication protocols ...
- Report card of how the City anticipated issues and took action to mitigate
- Lessons learned:
  - PSAs should be sent to the radio stations... we cannot assume the internet and phones will work in
  - Alternate water service for residents
  - Ordinances requiring senior center communities and residents to check on and provide for residents during a crisis and have resources in-situ
  - Improved communication to Council.... sometimes you actually have to pick up the phone and call all Council Members, not just one or two
  - Electrical connections to essential systems to be able to connect generators, and backup generators at critical points
  - Documented ConOps Plans for various emergency situations (flooding, tornado, winter freezes, electrical outages, fire, etc.) developed in conjunction with our local neighbors (EDS, PfISD, Manville Water District, Travis County, Cities of Round Rock, Austin, Manor, Hutto)

## Winter Storm Uri Preparation and Timeline

- February 8<sup>th</sup> (Monday)
  - o Streets Division: In anticipation of inclement weather, crews began to closely monitor progressing conditions and started to stockpile sand expecting that sanding roads would be necessary.
- February 9<sup>th</sup> (Tuesday):
  - o Streets Division: Crews began to prepare equipment including equipping the second dump truck with sander.
- February 10<sup>th</sup> (Wednesday):
  - o Streets Division: Staffing plans finalized and put in place to have an A/B rotating 12-hour shift and sanding equipment was tested and loaded with sand for operation.
- February 11th (Thursday)
  - o Police Department: 8:42am, messaged staff the National Weather Service (NWS) weather update addressing the freezing rain and ice expected for the first round of ice.
  - o Facilities Maintenance: Crews placed de-icing material on sidewalks at City facilities.
  - o Streets Division: Crews continued to acquire sand for roadways, distributed tire chains, and the shift rotation began with the first response taking place due to reports of icing on roadways.
  - o Utility Division: As had been done previously during the previous snowstorm, crews inspected various water and lift station utility sites to confirm that they were still insulated and had heat trace installed where required. Both treatment plants were inspected and crews confirmed that plant facilities were still insulated and heat trace was working properly. Generators, where equipped, were confirmed to have full diesel tanks.
- February 12th (Friday)
  - o Police Department: Shared NWS weather update regarding freezing rain for Friday night and that it wouldn't be as bad as the previous evening. Also address concern for Sunday night into Monday with more freezing rain, snow and record low temperatures. PD vehicles installed with snow chains.
  - o Streets Division: Crews continued to monitor conditions, sanded roadways where needed, and stockpiled additional sanding material.
  - o Utility Division: Crews completed another daily check of both the winterization of various facilities as well as confirmed generator fuel levels where generators are equipped.
- February 14th (Sunday)

- o Street Division: Crews communicated and updated staff on Teams regarding continued monitoring of conditions and addressed any issues reported while sanding essential areas such as Fire Department and Hospital driveways.
- o Utility Division: Crews found that the winterization on the Pfennig Pump Station fill valve was insufficient for the small brass lines that dump water onto the cover of the valve and it had frozen shut. Staff worked through the night to get the bypass open which would have been sufficient for a short time but would eventually need to be throttled by staff as needed. This would have been manageable if we were to continue to have power at the water treatment plant. On the night of February 14th and into the morning of February 15th, staff were notified that rolling power outages were to be expected for facilities into the night and the morning.
- February 15<sup>th</sup> (Monday)
  - o NWS Weather Update indicated roadways across the state have become impassable due to snow and ice and indicated “Rolling power outages are occurring throughout Texas early this morning to reduce demand on the electrical system”. The NWS also alerted that more freezing rain was possible Tuesday night into Wednesday.
  - o Set up in person EOC at the Police Department -
    - Lt Lozano/Sgt Culligan/Sgt Thomas – Operation Section Chiefs
    - Sereniah Breland/ Jason Smith – Incident Commanders
    - Terri Toledo/Maggie Holman – PIO Chiefs
    - Evan Groeschel/Daniel Wilson/Mike Lanahan – Public Works
    - Corporal Hailes/Sgt Delarosa/James Hartshorn- Finance Chiefs
    - Amy Giannini/Brandon Pritchett/Max Walther - Utilities
  - o TEAMS channel created specifically for the event, directing all comms to go through that channel.
  - o Staff was able to utilize the web-based business communication platform, Microsoft Teams, before and during Winter Storm Uri. Microsoft Teams allowed for the capacity to track projects using a whiteboard feature, capture conversations, make calls, perform video meetings, and store files and pictures in one central location. Approximately 90 **new** documents were created and shared on this platform during the week of Winter Storm Uri, with over **1,400** posts and messages exchanged. Microsoft Teams has been adopted as the communication platform for the entire organization. However, we recognize that Microsoft Teams was a highly effective way to communicate during incidents, and we will adopt this platform for any future incident.
  - o Whiteboard Feature - Allowed for 19 categories of tasks to be completed.
    - This feature allowed for tasks to be assigned and marked complete.

- Was also useful as a “list” feature to see updates on boil water notices, personnel needing transportation, and personnel schedules.
- o Streets Division: Crews delivered the Police Department 3- 4x4 vehicles, continued sanding roadways, and transporting staff when necessary.
- o Utility Division: Rolling outages were experienced at both of the treatment plants as well as various water and wastewater facilities across town. In response, water operators and crews continued to push as much water into town as feasible when they had power and also pumped wastewater lift stations as low as they could while they had power. Given the nature of the water treatment plant’s start-up time and the complexity of starting from a hard stop can be, the volume of water that was able to be produced before the next rolling outage was experienced was only in the neighborhood of 100,000 gallons per cycle. Later in the morning, when it appeared that the outages at the water treatment plant were no longer “rolling outages,” we confirmed that the problem wasn’t internal to the water treatment plant and that it was indeed the entire area around the facility by confirming voltage at both electric meters. While the power was out, we had to keep staff on-site as we didn’t know when power would be restored and we needed to be able to turn everything up as needed when power was restored. Staff took rotating 12-hour shifts (as would be normal during a weekend day as well with the exception that they would leave after 12 hours) sleeping on a cot in one of the rooms while the others took over the watch. These shifts without power consisted of performing rounds around the facility to see if they could find any damage to any components of the facility and also assisting Line Maintenance to get the GapVax out of the interior bay as it needed to be stored indoors during the initial event to prevent components from freezing. While the water treatment plant was without power, the wastewater treatment plant continued to have electric service until February 16th. Power was lost at Well 7 for an extended period of time which allowed the chlorine push-water line to freeze given the heat trace was non-operational and that water was not flowing as it normally would if the site had power. Staff were unable to address this until after the storm subsided due to the site not regaining electric service until well after the rest of the system and also the flow from the well would not have been able to even make up 10% of the flow that we were producing from the plant at the time so efforts were focused on the water treatment plant and lake pump station.
- February 16<sup>th</sup> (Tuesday)
  - o Streets Division: Crews sanded roadways, monitored generators, and began hauling fuel as needed. Crews also obtained additional sanding material.
  - o Facilities Maintenance: Crews applied de-icing materials to sidewalks at City Facilities and wrapped outside pipes. Facilities Maintenance staff began extended

hours when and following the event checked all City Facilities for damage and began scheduling repairs where necessary.

- o Utility Division: the wastewater treatment plant lost power and staff were forced to run everything within the facility without wasting through the biosolids building as it doesn't have emergency power generation. This was mitigated due to the lower flows in the short term but created an issue where heaters and heat trace at the building were not keeping the potable (particularly the above-ground RPZs that hold water) and non-potable water lines warm enough to not freeze. Operations staff were rotating 12-hour shifts at the facility to ensure we stayed within our sample analysis time window to stay in compliance while also performing normal plant operations and constantly keeping an eye on the generator fuel levels to relay needs.
- February 17<sup>th</sup> (Wednesday)
  - o Utilities Division: Utility Maintenance staff were assisting both the plants with any issues that came up and checking on generator fuel levels at lift station sites that have diesel. They were also closely monitoring two of our lift stations that do not have emergency power generators on-site to ensure we didn't have a Sanitary Sewer Overflow (SSO) at these two sites as they are both extremely close to the creek and were experiencing rolling outages. When the sites had power, maintenance staff manually pumped them as far as they could when they had power. After power was restored to the facilities, both operations and maintenance staff had to move quickly to start to get water flowing into the treatment facility to better assess if there were any further damages that hadn't been seen originally. Luckily, the only significant damage at the water treatment plant was to the water softener system that allows for the chlorine generation system to work effectively. Since staff had prepared their chemical storage by getting bulk deliveries the week prior to the storm and they were keeping the chlorine generation system constantly running to keep larger volumes of storage, we had some time to repair/replace the softeners. Once water was being produced at the plant, we started to send water out to the distribution system which presented it's own challenges. We had to throttle back the discharge valves of the High Service Pumps as they require a certain amount of backpressure to not fault out. Since the line was dewatered, we didn't have that backpressure and had to have one person stay there all night and into the morning adjusting the valve to make sure that we had the required backpressure to keep sending water out into the distribution system. This was interrupted on the first night due to a minor power drop that caused the plant to shut back down, but it was immediately restored and we had to continue this

operation at the High Service Pump Station. We had to manually throttle these valves until we restored distribution pressures on the discharge header above 80 psi.

- February 18<sup>th</sup> (Thursday)
  - o Utility Division: Utility Maintenance had significant water calls to respond to for customers and water operations staff needed to start taking samples for water quality all over town. After water pressure was restored at the WWTP, we noticed the leaks in the potable water line at the centrifuge and repaired it quickly to get the centrifuges back up and running. Once they were up, we had to waste 24 hours a day until the following Monday to catch up with solids and to keep our clarifier blankets under control. After that, we had to take time to drain and clean the extended chlorine contact channel as solids had started to build up significantly there as well.
  - o Facilities Maintenance: Crews began to evaluate all City Facilities for damage due to the weather event and began scheduling and making repairs as necessary.

## **EOC Summary**

The National Incident Management System (NIMS), created by FEMA, provides principles, structure, and processes to link responders all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and private organizations together for emergency events. NIMS is important for a unified standard of training, systems, and processes to effectively prevent, respond, and recover from emergency incidents.

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a unified structure and process created through NIMS that divides responsibilities in five sections. It is a standard approach for command, control, and coordination of on-scene incident management. ICS ensures that the most pressing needs are met, and that resources are used without duplication or waste.

The Incident Commander has overall responsibility for an incident and sets objectives within the Incident Command System. In this event, we set up a joint command to better support the EOC. Command staff, such as the PIO Chief, logistics chief, operations chief, finance chief, planning chief, and safety officer carry out functions that are needed to support the incident commander. The incident commander is responsible for knowing policy, ensuring safety, setting priorities, establishing ICS organization, and coordinating staff activities. The incident commander also approves resource requests, coordinates with other agencies through webeoc, and ensures an action after report is completed, and authorizes information release to the media.